Chinese nuclear forces are expanding at a pace unmatched by other countries, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reporting an annual increase of approximately 100 warheads since 2023. The nation now possesses at least 600 nuclear warheads and is constructing around 350 intercontinental ballistic missile silos—developments projected to put China on par with the United States and Russia in ICBM capability by the end of the decade.
SIPRI’s latest yearbook, issued on 16 June, emphasises that global nuclear arsenals are returning to growth after decades of contraction. The combined military stockpiles of nuclear warheads now total around 9,614, while approximately 2,100 warheads—mostly held by the United States and Russia—remain on high alert.
Although China’s nuclear stockpile remains modest compared to the U.S. and Russia—each holding over 5,000 warheads—the momentum behind its expansion marks a strategic shift. SIPRI forecasts that China could field up to 1,500 warheads by 2035, with its ICBM network rivalling that of the established nuclear powers by 2030. The rapid rise in Beijing’s deterrent capacity signals a deeper global arms competition, exacerbated by a breakdown in arms-control agreements.
China’s nuclear modernisation encompasses land-, sea-, and air-based delivery systems. The PLA Rocket Force has deployed a mix of silo-based and mobile ICBMs, including the potent DF-41 system capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. Simultaneously, China is advancing a nuclear triad, with bombers like the H‑6K equipped for long-range missions and an expanding fleet of Jin‑class ballistic missile submarines.
Pentagon estimates align with SIPRI’s findings. A U.S. Defence Department report placed China’s warhead count at over 600 and predicts over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030. Analysts note that while many of China’s warheads are stored separately from delivery systems, the growth in silo infrastructure indicates a potential shift towards higher operational readiness.
China maintains its nuclear policy centres on minimum deterrence and no‑first‑use. A spokesperson reaffirmed that its buildup is defensive and that global nuclear reductions should be led by the U.S. and Russia. Yet, the introduction of launch-on-warning capabilities, expansion of missile silos, and pairing of warheads with ICBMs suggest a more assertive posture.
The international ramifications are considerable. SIPRI warns that with diminishing arms controls and growing arsenals, the world faces a dangerous escalation. The concentration of high-alert warheads in U.S. and Russian hands, combined with China’s acceleration, elevates risk profiles significantly. Moreover, emerging technologies such as AI integration in nuclear command-and-control raise alarms about stability and inadvertent escalation.
China’s rise spurs debate among military analysts and policymakers. Supporters view the deepening triad and ICBM deployment as necessary to counter U.S. strategic capabilities. Critics argue that rapid armament undermines global non‑proliferation efforts and threatens to trigger competitive buildups among established nuclear powers. Calls for renewed arms control dialogues now include China, challenging historical norms where Beijing was often excluded from global negotiations.
Meanwhile, other nuclear-armed states—India, Pakistan, the UK, France, North Korea and Israel—continue modernisation programs. India and Pakistan are increasing their stockpiles; the UK has announced an expansion; North Korea is pursuing missile tests; and Israel maintains opacity under its policy of nuclear ambiguity.
Global security experts warn that the dismantling of arms-control institutions, such as the withdrawal from the INF Treaty and uncertainty around New START, has created a vacuum. Amid rising nuclear rhetoric, SIPRI urges urgent diplomatic engagement and the strengthening of verification and non‑proliferation regimes. As nuclear power parity becomes conceivable, the need for inclusive multilateral frameworks has grown acute.
